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Derk Pereboom argues that since we are not ultimately morally responsible for our 
thoughts and actions, it is irrational and unfair to feel and express moral anger towards agents for 
their wrongdoings. Furthermore, he argues, moral anger is not practically beneficial, typically 
causing more harm than good. Thus, he proposes that we replace moral anger with moral 
sadness, or disappointment in response to agents’ wrongdoings. I offer a functional account of 
moral anger to argue that moral anger has important intrapersonal and interpersonal functions 
that cannot be served by moral sadness. I show that when we feel and express moral anger in the 
right contexts, it a) promotes long-term wellbeing, b) benefits relationships, and c) is the best 
way to change agents’ future behavior. I conclude by discussing implications of my functional 
account for Pereboom’s claim that moral anger is rational and fair only if we are ultimately 
morally responsible.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Derk Pereboom defines moral anger as a type of anger that we feel in response to agents 
when they wrong us, or someone else, to hold them accountable for their wrongdoing (2009, 
172). When we express moral anger, he claims, we do so to retributively punish, or get even 
with, the agent for their wrongdoing (2013, 128). For example, when an agent steals my car, I 
feel moral anger towards the agent for wronging me, and when I express moral anger with the 
agent, I do so to punish him by making him feel bad for wronging me. In contrast, I may feel 
non-moral anger, like frustration, when a fallen tree crushes my car, but I would not hold the tree 
accountable for wronging me, or express anger with the tree to make it feel bad for wronging me 
(Pereboom 2009, 172). Given this definition of moral anger, Pereboom argues that the feeling 
and expression of moral anger are justified only when i) agents are ultimately morally 
responsible for their wrongdoings and ii) moral anger is practically beneficial to the self and 
others (2009, 171). When moral anger is not justified in these ways, he proposes that we try our 
best to eliminate it from our emotional experiences and social interactions (2013, 152). 
First, Pereboom argues that agents are never ultimately morally responsible for their 
wrongdoings, because they are not the ultimate sources of their thoughts and actions. In other 
words, since factors external to agents’ control, such as past events, psychological 
predispositions, and circumstantial luck, likely determine their thoughts and actions, they are not 
ultimately morally responsible for their wrongdoings (Pereboom 2013, 1). If agents are not 
ultimately morally responsible for their wrongdoings, then it is irrational to feel moral anger 
towards them, in the same way that it is irrational for us to feel morally angry towards a fallen 
tree for crushing our car. Furthermore, if agents are not ultimately morally responsible for their 
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wrongdoings, then it is unfair to express moral anger with them to make them feel bad for their 
wrongdoings.  
Second, Pereboom argues that moral anger is not practically beneficial, because in most 
cases it causes more harm than good to the self and others: (a) moral anger disrupts peace of 
mind and thus decreases individuals’ overall wellbeing (2013, 175); (b) it tends to prevent 
reconciliation and damage interpersonal relationships (2009, 172); and (c) it is usually 
ineffective in changing agents’ future behaviors (2009, 173). He claims that, all things 
considered, moral anger is “suboptimal” relative to another emotion we can feel and express with 
each other in response to wrongdoings: moral sadness, or disappointment accompanied by 
sadness for the agent (2009, 171). 
In Pereboom’s view, whereas emotions like moral anger and guilt are focused on 
retribution, or getting even for past events, emotions like moral sadness and regret are “forward-
looking” because they are focused on facilitating positive future outcomes, such as reconciliation 
and reforming an agent’s behavior (2013, 135). Since moral sadness does not entail retribution 
and focuses on positive future outcomes, he argues that it does not require agents to be ultimately 
morally responsible for their wrongdoings and is more likely than moral anger to practically 
benefit the self and others. Consequentially, he proposes that we “disavow” moral anger, and 
instead foster moral sadness in response to agents’ wrongdoings (2013, 181). While he 
acknowledges that we cannot entirely prevent ourselves from feeling moral anger in response to 
wrongdoings, he argues that we can regulate our feelings of moral anger and limit its experience 
and expression over time (2013, 182).  
In this thesis, I argue that moral anger serves indispensable social functions that cannot 
be served by moral sadness, such that universally replacing moral anger with moral sadness 
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would be practically harmful to the self and others. I adopt a functionalist view of emotions 
under which moral anger produces distinct adaptive responses to the perception of injustice in 
one’s environment (Haidt 2003). Building on a multi-level analysis of the functions of emotions 
(Keltner & Haidt 1999), I describe the intrapersonal function of moral anger in terms of how it 
informs and prepares individuals to adaptively respond to injustice, and the interpersonal 
function of moral anger in terms of how it facilitates productive social interactions and 
influences agents’ future behavior. 
Moral sadness is an appropriate response to agents’ wrongdoings when the agent fails to 
meet an individual’s positive expectations, and the agent sympathizes with the individual she 
wronged (Lelieveld, Dijk, Beest, & Kleef 2013). However, moral anger is a more appropriate 
response when we must actively confront some form of injustice, particularly when we do not 
have any positive expectations from the agent or the agent does not sympathize with us, for 
example in cases where the wrongdoer benefits from oppressing others. Thus, whether moral 
anger or moral sadness will be more practically useful to feel and express critically depends on 
which emotion is more appropriate given the circumstances surrounding the agent’s action and 
the relationship between the individual and the agent. When we feel and express moral anger in 
the right contexts, it a) promotes the long-term wellbeing of individuals, b) communicates 
invaluable information about an individual’s beliefs and intentions, ultimately benefitting 
interpersonal relationships, and c) is the most effective way to change agents’ future behavior.  
At the intrapersonal level, moral anger informs the individual that an agent has done 
something unjust, and prepares the individual to confront the agent (Keltner & Haidt 1999, 509). 
Meanwhile, moral sadness informs the individual that an agent has failed to live up to certain 
positive expectations, and prepares the individual to disengage from those expectations (Dijk & 
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Zeelenberg 2002, 323). While moral anger, like moral sadness, disrupts peace of mind and feels 
unpleasant in the short-term, it ultimately protects us from present and future harm and promotes 
individuals’ long-term wellbeing.  
At the interpersonal level, moral anger communicates disapproval of the agent’s actions, 
the readiness to confront the agent for his actions (Haidt 2003, 856), and the potential for 
escalation that could damage the relationship (Lelieveld et al. 2013, 607). While moral sadness 
can also communicate disapproval of the agent’s actions, it communicates the readiness to 
disengage rather than confront (Lieleveld et al. 2013, 607), and the potential for social 
withdrawal from the agent (Dijk & Zeelenberg 2002, 323). Drawing on studies of negotiation 
and cooperation, I show that moral anger communicates an individual’s limits, or the point 
beyond which they are not willing to negotiate (Dijk, Kleef, Steinel and Beest 2008, 600), and is 
often more sensitive to reparations from the wrongdoer than moral sadness (Hutcherson & Gross 
2011, 733). Thus, while the expression of moral anger runs the risk of damaging relationships, it 
also provides the agent with the opportunity to make reparations before the relationship is 
beyond repair. 
Finally, building on the interpersonal function of moral anger, I argue that in certain 
contexts, moral anger is the most effective way to incentivize agents to change their social 
behavior. Since moral anger usually causes agents to feel fear, and can lead to escalation or 
social rejection, it tends to deter agents from wronging others, and encourages them to change 
their offensive behavior (Keltner & Haidt 2001). While moral sadness can also incentivize agents 
to change their social behavior, research indicates that moral sadness typically serves this 
function only if the agent sympathizes with the individual and feels guilty for their wrongdoing. 
When agents do not feel guilty, they are more likely to exploit the individual in response to 
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moral sadness, rather than change their behavior (Lieleveld et al. 2013, 615). Thus, both moral 
anger and moral sadness can affect agents’ behavior by making them feel bad for their 
wrongdoings, and whether moral anger or moral sadness will be more effective in changing an 
agent’s behavior depends largely on context.  
Both moral anger and moral sadness respond to agents’ wrongdoings and serve essential 
intrapersonal and interpersonal functions. However, moral anger uniquely prepares an individual 
to confront injustice, ultimately protecting individuals from harm, benefitting relationships, and 
incentivizing agents to change their harmful behavior. Importantly, these functions are all 
forward-looking since they relate to future safety and stability, future cooperation, and an agent’s 
future behavior (Pereboom 2013, 135). Thus, I conclude by suggesting that my functional 
account of moral anger not only demonstrates the indispensible practical benefits of moral anger, 
but also undermines Pereboom’s view that moral anger is not forward-looking, and thereby only 
justified if we are ultimately morally responsible. We likely are not ultimately morally 
responsible for our thoughts and actions, but I argue that such responsibility is not required to 
justify feeling and expressing moral anger. When moral anger is an appropriate response to an 
agent’s wrongdoing given the circumstances surrounding the agent’s action and the relationship 
between the individual and the agent, moral anger is justified to feel and express.  
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2 PEREBOOM’S PROBLEM WITH MORAL ANGER 
Pereboom argues that in order to be ultimately morally responsible for our wrongdoings, 
we must be the ultimate sources of our thoughts and actions. If factors external to our control, 
such as past events, psychological predispositions, or circumstantial luck, determine our thoughts 
and actions, then we are not their ultimate sources (2013, 1). He argues that modern science, 
including research in physics and psychology, provide evidence that factors external to our 
control most likely determine our thoughts and actions: 
If we as substances had the power to cause decisions without being causally 
determined to cause them – we would have this type of free will. But although our 
being undetermined agent-causes has not been ruled out as a coherent possibility, 
it is not credible given our best physical theories. (2013, 3) 
Since it is highly unlikely that we are the ultimate sources of our thoughts and actions, he argues 
that we are not justified in holding agents ultimately morally responsible for their wrongdoings.  
According to Pereboom, when we experience and express emotions like moral anger and 
guilt in response to agents’ wrongdoings, we hold agents ultimately morally responsible for their 
thoughts and actions, so we should try our best to eliminate them from our emotional experiences 
and social interactions (2009, 178). Moral anger consists of resentment, or anger targeted at an 
agent because she wronged me, and indignation, or anger targeted at an agent because she 
wronged someone else (Strawson 1962; Pereboom 2009, 172),1 whereas guilt involves anger 
with oneself because I wronged someone else (Pereboom 2013, 186). Importantly, Pereboom 
                                                 
1 P.F. Strawson originally defined the terms resentment and indignation as “reactive attitudes” that respond 
to agents’ wrongdoings in his essay “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). Strawson argued that resentment and 
indignation do not rely on the belief that agents are ultimately morally responsible for their wrongdoings, and 
instead rely on the extent to which we perceive an agent’s thoughts and actions to demonstrate ill will (or 
indifference) towards others (190). Pereboom adopts Strawson’s terminology to argue that agents only demonstrate 
genuine ill will (or indifference) towards others when they are the ultimate sources of their thoughts and actions 
(2013, 8).  
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takes moral anger and guilt to presuppose the justifiability of “basic desert,” or giving the agent 
what she deserves for knowingly committing a wrongdoing:  
For an agent to be morally responsible for an action is for it to be hers in such a 
way that she would deserve blame if she understood it was morally wrong… 
given her sensitivity to its moral status, and not by virtue of consequentialist or 
contractualist considerations (2009, 170).  
Basic desert involves retributive punishment, or punishing an agent for their wrongdoing with 
the aim of getting even with the agent, or harming them because they caused harm. Pereboom 
contrasts retributive punishment with forward-looking forms of punishment that only punish 
agents with the aim of deterring the agent or other agents from future wrongdoings, for example 
by isolating the agent from others (2013, 169). Under his view, the expression of moral anger to 
an agent is itself a form of retributive punishment insofar as it intends to make the agent feel bad 
for their wrongdoing (2013, 134). Thus, he claims moral anger is “backward-looking” insofar as 
it focuses on retribution for past actions, rather than positive future outcomes such as reforming 
the agent or deterring future harm (2013, 135).  
Pereboom argues that because agents are not ultimately morally responsible for their 
thoughts and actions, it is irrational to feel moral anger towards them, in the same way that it is 
irrational for us to feel morally angry towards a fallen tree for crushing our car. Furthermore, 
since agents are not ultimately morally responsible for their thoughts and actions, they do not 
deserve retributive punishment for their wrongdoings: it is unfair to express moral anger towards 
agents for their wrongdoings to make them feel bad. 
In response to such criticisms about moral anger, many philosophers and psychologists 
argue that even if moral anger were irrational and unfair, it would still be justified from a 
8 
pragmatic perspective. For example, Saul Smilanksy (2000) argues that while we are not 
ultimately morally responsible, we need the illusion of responsibility to maintain self-worth and 
a meaningful life, and Shaun Nichols (2007) argues that even if it were possible to eliminate 
moral anger, we shouldn’t because we need to express moral anger towards agents to deter 
harmful behavior. Pereboom defends his view from such objections by arguing that moral anger 
is not only irrational and unfair, but also unjustified from a pragmatic perspective. According to 
Pereboom, moral anger typically causes more harm than good to the self and others, and can be 
replaced by an emotion that is rational, fair, and more practically beneficial: moral sadness, or 
disappointment accompanied by sadness for the agent. 
In this section, I expand on Pereboom’s pragmatic argument against moral anger, and in 
favor of moral sadness. In section 2.1, I elaborate on Pereboom’s definition of moral sadness and 
how he proposes that we replace the experience of moral anger with the experience of moral 
sadness. In section 2.2, I discuss his claim that moral anger is bad for the self insofar as it 
disrupts peace of mind (2013, 175), and compare this claim to his justification for feeling what 
he calls fury, a type of non-moral anger. In section 2.3, I discuss his claim that moral anger 
prevents reconciliation and damages interpersonal relationships (2009, 172), and why he takes 
moral sadness to be a preferable alternative to moral anger in this regard. In section 2.4, I discuss 
his claim that moral anger is usually ineffective compared to moral sadness in changing agents’ 
future behaviors (2009, 173). After laying out Pereboom’s argument, I turn in section 3 to offer 
objections to each of these claims against the practical benefits of moral anger. I argue that moral 
anger is the most practically beneficial response to an agent’s wrongdoing when we must 
actively confront the agent. In such cases, moral sadness would be an inappropriate response, 
and would likely fail to benefit the self and others.  
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2.1 Moral Sadness and the Regulation of Moral Anger 
Pereboom claims that since moral anger holds agents ultimately morally responsible for 
their wrongdoings, we should try our best to eliminate moral anger in response to agents’ 
wrongdoings. In place of moral anger, he claims we should feel “hurt or shocked or 
disappointed” about the agent’s wrongdoing, and feel “moral sadness or sorrow and concern” for 
the agent (2013, 180). I summarize this set of emotional responses as moral sadness, or 
disappointment accompanied by sadness for the agent. Below, I clarify the relationship between 
disappointment and sadness, and explain how he advises that we replace moral anger with moral 
sadness.  
Feeling hurt, shocked, and disappointed in the psychological literature has been tied to 
both sadness and anger, depending on whether the individual believes a certain goal can still be 
attained or not. If the individual believes they can still attain a goal, these feelings are more 
likely to be accompanied by anger, whereas if the individual has given up on a goal, these 
feelings are accompanied by sadness (Levine 1996). Since Pereboom contrasts moral anger to 
feeling hurt, shocked, and disappointed by the agent’s actions, and suggests that we should also 
feel sadness for the agent, he is likely referring exclusively to forms of disappointment that are 
accompanied by sadness. Disappointment in response to someone’s actions is typically 
accompanied by the appraisal, or evaluation, that the person failed to meet some positive 
expectations (Van Dijk & Van Harreveld 2008), and sadness is typically accompanied by the 
appraisal that something harmful has occurred that is out of my control. Thus, moral sadness 
entails disappointment about the agent’s wrongdoing because they failed to live up to positive 
expectations, and sadness for the agent because the harm they caused was ultimately out of their 
control. For example, I would feel non-moral sadness when I lose a competition, or my mother 
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falls deeply ill, but I would feel moral sadness when a schizophrenic harms an innocent person, 
or a 5-year old child bullies her classmate.  
In the case of the schizophrenic or the child, moral sadness may be a natural response 
because we do not generally hold people accountable for their wrongdoings when they lack the 
capacity to understand and control their actions. However, when people have the capacity to 
rationally deliberate about their actions and exercise self-control (Fischer & Ravizza 1998), we 
tend to treat them as agents who are accountable for the harm they cause. Thus, if I learn that I 
lost a competition because my opponent rigged it, or my mother became ill because government 
officials neglected to treat the drinking water in her town, then my natural response would be 
moral anger, not moral sadness. In cases like these, Pereboom claims that some degree of moral 
anger is inevitable, endorsing Seth Shabo’s claim that sometimes feeling and expressing moral 
anger is “only human” (2012, 107). However, he argues that by reminding ourselves that agents 
are not ultimately morally responsible for their wrongdoings, and recognizing that moral anger is 
irrational and unfair to feel and express with agents, we can limit the feeling and expression of 
moral anger over time (2013, 182): 
Free will skeptics can expect that some degree of local and immediate resentment 
and indignation is unavoidable. But in the long term, we might well be able to 
take measures that would moderate or eliminate resentment and indignation, and 
in particular their overt expressions, and given a belief in free will skepticism, we 
would then do so for the sake of morality and rationality. (2013, 152) 
Much like firemen become accustomed to down-regulating their fear in response to a burning 
building because they value saving lives, Pereboom argues we can become accustomed to down-
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regulating our moral anger in response to agents’ wrongdoings because we value rationality and 
fairness.  
Importantly, Pereboom claims that “feigned” moral sadness is manipulative, and fails to 
secure the practical benefits of replacing moral anger with moral sadness (Pereboom 2009, 173). 
Thus, he proposes that rather than suppressing moral anger and pretending to feel differently 
than we do, we should foster genuine moral sadness in response to agents’ wrongdoings. While 
he does not provide an account of how such emotion regulation could take place, he seems to be 
invoking the concept of reappraisal.  
In the psychological literature on emotions, reappraisal is an emotion regulation strategy 
that changes how one feels in response to an emotional stimulus by reinterpreting the meaning of 
the stimulus (Gross 1998). For example, an agent stealing my car would typically elicit an 
appraisal that the agent did something unjust to me, or something for which he had “no 
justification or right” (Haidt 2003, 856), and I would likely feel moral anger towards the agent 
for wronging me. Pereboom suggests that by reinterpreting the theft as an action ultimately 
caused by factors beyond the agent’s control, such as financial pressures, we can change how we 
feel in response to the agent. By reappraising the agent’s wrongdoing in this way, he claims that 
we can sympathize with the agent and our moral anger can change into moral sadness. In what 
follows, I detail Pereboom’s argument that moral anger is never more practically beneficial than 
moral sadness, and why we should always down-regulate our moral anger in response to agents’ 
wrongdoings. 
2.2 Moral Anger is Bad for the Self 
While there is some variability in how we experience and express moral anger, it is 
typically accompanied by a feeling of emotional pain in response to the agent’s wrongdoing, 
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motivation to retaliate against the agent (Haidt 2003, 856), and bodily changes including 
increased heart rate, elevated blood pressure, and increased adrenaline and noradrenaline 
(Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). These physiological, subjective, and behavioral changes 
are hedonically unpleasant and have the capacity to lead us to engage in reckless or violent 
behaviors. 
Pereboom argues that since moral anger feels bad and has the capacity to lead us to 
engage in harmful behaviors, we would be better off without ever experiencing it. In support of 
this claim, Pereboom references Stoicism, an Ancient Greek tradition that sought to show that 
most emotions are irrational and prevent one from being happy. Pereboom adopts aspects of 
Stoicism, including the notion that accepting that we are not the ultimate sources of our thoughts 
and actions could lead us to accept “the course our lives take” and produce tranquility in 
response to hardship (2013, 175). He also references philosopher Baruch Spinoza, who claimed 
that emotions like moral anger increase turbulence and decrease serenity in one’s emotional life 
(2013, 175). In contrast to moral anger, Pereboom argues that moral sadness feels calmer and is 
thereby less disruptive to peace of mind (2013, 175). Furthermore, he argues, since moral 
sadness entails some degree of sadness for the wrongdoer, it facilitates sympathetic 
communication with the wrongdoer (2013, 180) rather than condemnation (2009, 172). 
Overall, Pereboom claims that we would be both happier and better able to address social 
challenges if we eliminated moral anger. In Pereboom’s view, while most human anger is moral 
anger (2009, 172), there are forms of non-moral anger, like fury, that are practically useful and 
necessary to address certain social challenges. Fury is anger that we would feel in response to a 
threat that has to be “violently neutralized,” or that requires physical self-defense (2013, 147). 
Fury, for Pereboom, is a form of non-moral anger since it responds to a physical threat, rather 
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than the perception of wrongdoing by an agent. Since the aim of fury is to defend rather than 
punish, he claims it does not rely on ultimate moral responsibility (2013, 147). Thus, if you 
encountered a violent bear, or a murderer, fury would be justified in order to defend yourself, 
and would be practically necessary to help you and those around you.   
In most cases of moral wrongdoing, he argues, we do not need to physically defend 
ourselves, or others, and in those cases it is best for us to down-regulate our moral anger and 
foster moral sadness in its place (2013, 147). Thus, while forms of non-moral anger have 
important practical functions in the context of self-defense, moral anger is practically harmful to 
the self and decreases one’s overall wellbeing. In section 2.3, I shift the focus from the 
detrimental effects of feeling moral anger at the individual level to the effects of expressing 
moral anger in interpersonal contexts. Ultimately, he argues, moral anger damages interpersonal 
relationships, which causes harm to both the self and others.  
2.3 Moral Anger is Bad for Relationships  
Despite the aggressive nature of moral anger, many philosophers and psychologists argue 
that moral anger is necessary to communicate blame, and that such communication is an 
essential component of interpersonal relationships (Strawson 1962). Pereboom rejects this 
notion, arguing that moral anger is more likely to damage relationships than benefit them: 
[Moral anger] often fails to contribute to the well being of those to whom it is 
directed. Frequently it is intended to cause physical or emotional pain, and can 
give rise to destructive resistance instead of reconciliation. As a result, it has the 
potential to damage or destroy relationships. (2013, 180) 
Anger has been associated with the motivation to insult, attack, or humiliate the target of one’s 
anger, and we often take pleasure in the expectation or act of revenge (Haidt 2003, 856; 
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Pereboom 2009, 172). Such harsh retaliatory behaviors have the potential to cause irreparable 
damage to a relationship, or provoke retaliation from the agent that would lead to further conflict 
rather than reconciliation. 
Meanwhile, he argues, genuine moral sadness allows us to communicate disapproval in 
interpersonal relationships without aggression and intimidation (2009, 173). Since it is less likely 
to provoke retaliation, and entails sympathy with the wrongdoer, he argues it is more likely to 
change the agent’s behavior, ultimately benefitting relationships. In section 2.4, I build on 
Pereboom’s argument that moral anger damages interpersonal relationships by expanding on his 
claim that anger is not as effective as moral sadness in changing an agent’s behavior.  
2.4 Moral Anger Does Not Effectively Change Agents’ Behavior 
Philosophers and psychologists agree that because moral anger promotes aggressive 
behavior, it is a costly strategy for addressing social challenges (Hutcherson & Gross 2011, 720; 
Nichols 2007, 417), and risks backfiring when trying to change an agent’s behavior (Wubber, 
Cremer, Dijk 2011, 495). Pereboom argues that while moral anger can encourage agents to 
reform, it is a “blunt instrument” that primarily succeeds in changing agents’ behavior through 
fear of punishment (2009, 176). He references studies on animal training to argue that while fear 
can motivate change, a better way to secure change in an agent’s behavior is positive 
reinforcement:      
A key point frequently emphasized is that expressions of anger and punitive 
responses very often have deleterious effects by comparison with non-punitive 
alternatives. Punishment causes fear and those who are submit to threat of punish 
will behave less creatively… threat of punishment produces much more stress 
than positive training methods. (2009, 177) 
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Pereboom uses such studies to argue that, at the very least, we do not need moral anger to change 
an agent’s behavior, and that nicer ways of correcting each other’s moral wrongdoings could 
produce agents that are motivated by “moral values” rather than the “self-interested 
consideration of avoiding anger and punishment” (2009, 176). Such agents, he claims, would 
have stronger motivation to refrain from harming others, and would do so happily, thus 
improving the quality of relationships.  
Though positive reinforcement may be more effective than punishment in the context of 
animal training or other forms of instruction (Pereboom 2013 147), philosophers and 
psychologists often reject the notion that moral sadness can substitute for moral anger when we 
need to confront an agent for their wrongdoing in the context of adult human relationships, or in 
cases of social injustice. For example, Nichols, citing psychologist Richard Lazarus, argues that 
moral sadness typically leads us to withdraw into ourselves rather than confront the wrongdoer 
and demand that they change their behavior (2007 420).  
Pereboom counters such criticisms by arguing that so long as moral sadness is 
accompanied by a resolve, or commitment, to fairness and justice, then we can be morally sad 
and motivated to act in ways that change an agent’s behavior. In support of this claim, Pereboom 
gives two examples. In the context of adult human relationships, he claims that “a strongly 
worded threat” could suffice in changing an agent’s behavior, and that moral sadness with 
resolve is enough to motivate us to provide such a threat (2009, 174). In the context of social 
injustice, Pereboom cites the success of historical figures such as Mahatma Gandhi and Martin 
Luther King Jr. (MLK) in resisting injustice without the use of moral anger (2013, 149). Thus, in 
adult relationships, and in cases of social injustice, Pereboom claims that moral sadness with 
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resolve would be more effective in changing agents’ behavior than moral anger. I will return to 
discuss these specific examples in greater detail in my objections in section 3.3.  
In sum, Pereboom argues that because moral sadness can fulfill all of the beneficial 
functions of moral anger, such as communicating blame and deterring bad behavior, we do not 
need moral anger. Furthermore, he argues that moral sadness ultimately yields better results for 
the self and others than moral anger, in so far as it is not turbulent, aggressive, intimidating, and 
“blunt” like moral anger. Thus, he argues, fostering moral sadness in response to agents’ 
wrongdoings will substantially benefit the self and others, and prevent the harmful intrapersonal 
and interpersonal consequences of moral anger.  
In section 3, I provide a functional comparison of moral anger and moral sadness to reject 
each of Pereboom’s claims against the practical benefits of feeling and expressing moral anger in 
response to agents’ wrongdoings. In doing so, I argue that moral anger is more appropriate than 
moral sadness when we need to actively confront injustice, and that in such cases, feeling and 
expressing moral sadness would be less practically beneficial than moral anger. Ultimately, I 
argue that the intrapersonal and interpersonal functions of moral anger are forward-looking in so 
far as they aim to facilitate positive future outcomes. Thus, when moral anger is appropriate 
given the circumstances surrounding the agent’s actions and the relationship between the 
individual and the agent, moral anger is justified.  
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3 A FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNT OF MORAL ANGER 
Prior to the 1990s, many emotion theorists described emotions as intrapersonally and 
interpersonally maladaptive in so far as they can disrupt peace of mind (Skinner 1948, 92) and 
interfere with reason and rationality in social contexts (Keltner & Gross 1999, 468). This view of 
emotions coheres with philosophical views like Pereboom’s that posit emotions, especially 
negative emotions like anger, against rational deliberation and moral behavior. Recently, 
however, most emotion theorists have adopted a functional perspective of emotions under which 
emotions are adaptive responses to social and physical problems in our environments (Keltner & 
Gross 1999, 468). This theoretical shift was inspired by a growing body of work demonstrating 
the crucial role that emotions play in structuring relationships and guiding social interactions, as 
well as increasing interdisciplinary work demonstrating how emotional experiences interact with 
and guide sociocultural norms (Keltner & Haidt 1999, 506).  
A functional view of emotions posits that emotions are the “intelligent interface” between 
environmental input, such as a social challenge, and adaptive output, such as a particular 
behavior or set of behaviors (Scherer 1994, 127). Theorists differ with respect to whether they 
define emotions and their functions in terms of evolution (Ekman 1992) or social construction 
(Barrett & Campos 1987), but they generally agree that the functions of emotions can be inferred 
by attending to the specific causes and consequences of emotions in our current environment 
(Keltner & Gross 1999, 470).  
Given that moral anger is typically caused by “a negative event for which another person 
is held responsible” (Smith & Ellsworth 1985), motivates approach-related behavior,2 such as 
                                                 
2 Moral anger has been associated with both approach and avoidance behaviors, but in both cases it is 
associated with high-energy expenditure (Averill 1982). Approach behaviors include confronting the agent, and 
avoidance behaviors include going out of your way to avoid the agent. Researchers thus generally characterize the 
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verbal or physical threat, and enables high-energy expenditure to defend the individual from an 
offensive act (Hutcherson & Gross 2011, 733), researchers characterize the function of moral 
anger as the reparation of injustice (Solomon 1990). Moral sadness is also typically caused by a 
negative event for which someone is responsible (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg 2002), but unlike 
moral anger it is crucially tied to unfulfilled positive expectations (Van Dijk & Van Harreveld 
2008). For example, an insult by a stranger is likely to elicit moral anger, whereas an insult by a 
close friend is likely to elicit moral sadness since I had positive expectations that my friend 
would not wrong me in this way. Moral sadness typically motivates avoidance behavior, such as 
withdrawal from the situation, and involves the feeling of helplessness and a desire to “do 
nothing” (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg 2002, 325). Thus, researchers characterize the function of 
moral sadness as an appeal for support (Ellsworth & Smith 1988), or a request for help (Van 
Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead 2006).  
In this section, I provide a functional comparison of moral anger and moral sadness to 
argue that moral anger is sometimes the most appropriate response considering the circumstances 
surrounding the agent’s actions and the relationship between the individual and the agent. In 
such cases, moral anger is the most practically beneficial emotion to feel and express. In section 
3.1, I compare the intrapersonal functions of moral anger and moral sadness in terms of how they 
inform and prepare an individual to respond to an agent’s wrongdoing. In section 3.2, I compare 
the interpersonal functions of moral anger and moral sadness in terms of what they communicate 
about an individual’s beliefs and intentions. In section 3.3, I build on the interpersonal functions 
of moral anger and moral sadness to discuss how they change other peoples’ behavior. I argue 
                                                                                                                                                             
avoidance behaviors associated with moral anger as active, compared to the passive avoidance behaviors associated 
with sadness (Hutcherson & Gross 2011, 733). 
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that both moral anger and moral sadness serve important intrapersonal and interpersonal 
functions, but that these functions are not interchangeable.  
3.1 The Intrapersonal Functions of Moral Anger and Moral Sadness 
In evaluating the intrapersonal function of emotions, researchers focus on the 
physiological changes, subjective feelings, and behavioral motivations associated with specific 
emotions. Pereboom argues that since the physiological changes, subjective feelings, and 
behavioral motivations associated with moral anger are unpleasant and aggressive, they disrupt 
peace of mind and decrease overall wellbeing. By fostering moral sadness in response to an 
agent’s wrongdoing, he claims we can remain calm and collected in the face of injustice, and 
thus maintain our peace of mind.  
However, research indicates that moral sadness is not always better for agents to feel in 
response to an agents’ wrongdoing. First, moral sadness also disrupts peace of mind, since it 
informs individuals that their positive expectations have not been met. This realization is 
hedonically unpleasant, and has the potential to be even more disturbing than moral anger. For 
example, feeling morally sad in response to an insult by a close friend often involves feeling not 
just offended, but also betrayed, which can feel worse than feeling morally angry in response to 
an insult by a stranger. Furthermore, moral sadness tends to last longer than moral anger 
(Hutcherson & Gross 2011, 730), so it seems more likely to negatively impact individuals’ long-
term wellbeing.  
Second, moral sadness does not adaptively prepare us to respond to an agents’ 
wrongdoing when we need to actively confront the agent. For example, if someone makes a 
highly racist remark towards me, and this action makes me morally sad, my moral sadness will 
prepare me to withdraw from rather than confront the agent. Whereas moral sadness is associated 
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with feeling powerless (Lieleveld et al. 2013, 605), moral anger is associated with feeling 
powerful (Roseman, Antonious, & Jose 1996) so it can help overcome feeling afraid or 
discouraged as the target of injustice. Thus, if I become morally angry in response to the agent’s 
remark, I will be more capable of actively defending myself, for example by approaching the 
agent to communicate that I am not willing to tolerate such comments.  
Research indicates that moral anger tends to motivate an active response until the 
injustice has been remedied, such that it diminishes if the agent apologizes or tries to make 
amends (Hutcherson & Gross 2011, 732). While getting morally angry feels unpleasant and 
motivates aggression, my act of aggression may protect me in the long run from future acts of 
racism by the agent or other agents. Though Pereboom is right that cases of moral wrongdoing 
often do not require physical retaliation, or “violent neutralization,” it practically benefits us to 
be prepared to defend ourselves in both moral and non-moral situations. Thus, moral anger, like 
fury, allows us to defend ourselves in a way that benefits us in both immediate and enduring 
ways.   
Pereboom claims that with resolve we would maintain the motivation to approach an 
agent and confront injustice, but if I am experiencing moral sadness, my resolve has to work 
against the physiological, subjective, and behavioral effects of moral sadness. While it is possible 
for individuals to be morally sad and resolved to confront injustice, research suggests that 
individuals must overcome their sadness and become angry, or feel a combination of both 
emotions in order to be motivated to confront someone (Levine 1996). For example, researchers 
have argued that when confrontation is unavoidable, getting angry is the most emotionally 
intelligent response, despite its unpleasant valence, since it best prepares individuals to navigate 
those situations (Ford & Tamir 2012). Hence, while moral anger, like moral sadness, incurs 
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short-term costs to happiness, these emotions can benefit us in the attainment of our goals, 
protect us from present and future harm, and thereby support our ability to attain lasting peace of 
mind and wellbeing. In section 3.2, I discuss how the communication of moral anger can 
promote reconciliation and benefit relationships. This interpersonal function of moral anger 
further supports the individual’s overall wellbeing, benefiting us at both the individual and 
dyadic level.  
3.2 The Interpersonal Functions of Moral Anger and Moral Sadness 
At the interpersonal level of the function of emotions, researchers explore how emotional 
expressions convey information about peoples’ emotions, beliefs, and intentions (Keltner & 
Haidt 1999, 511). Emotional expressions are relatively involuntary, and therefore provide a fairly 
reliable source of information about the individuals’ mental states and how they are likely to 
behave (Wubben et al. 2011, 490). Such information can in turn guide our emotions and 
behaviors towards them. For example, emotional expressions can evoke complementary or 
reciprocal emotional responses in others, such as fear in response to moral anger (Keltner & 
Haidt 1999, 511), guilt in response to moral sadness (Lelieveld et al. 2013, 606), or empathy 
(Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 1991). Thus, emotional communication rapidly coordinates 
social interactions and can promote understanding between individuals.  
Pereboom argues that since the expression of moral anger is aggressive and intimidating, 
and aims to inflict emotional pain on the agent, it is likely to lead agents to retaliate rather than 
understand how their actions offended the individual. Such retaliation could lead to escalation, 
rather than resolution, and therefore has the potential to seriously damage interpersonal 
relationships. Since moral sadness is calmer and entails sympathy with the agent, it promotes 
understanding and allows people to convey their dissatisfaction without offending the agent. 
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Thus, Pereboom argues that moral sadness is a better way to communicate disapproval with the 
aim of maintaining interpersonal relationships.   
Research confirms that the expression of moral anger has the potential to escalate an 
argument (Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Stienel, & Van Beest 2008), and that such expressions are 
generally costly and risky (Hutcherson & Gross 2011). However, moral anger is also proactive, 
motivating high-energy expenditure to overcome an obstacle (Hutcherson & Gross 2011, 733). 
Meanwhile, moral sadness is accompanied by passive behaviors and persisting judgments that 
can lead an individual to give up on a relationship rather than seek to repair it. Thus, while moral 
anger runs the risk of being too confrontational, moral sadness runs the risk of not being 
confrontational enough and failing to clearly express how an agent can change their behavior to 
benefit the relationship.  
Typically, we feel and express both moral anger and moral sadness in our relationships, 
depending on the particular context surrounding the agent’s action and how close we feel to the 
agent. For example, when a friend breaks a promise to help us with something, we are likely to 
feel and express moral sadness since we are disappointed that they did not help us, but still 
sympathize with them and understand that circumstances out of their control could have led them 
to break their promise. However, when the friend repeatedly breaks promises like this, we are 
likely to feel and express moral anger because they are neglecting to change their behavior, even 
when they know it harms us. Studies investigating the communication of anger in negotiations 
show that when a negotiator gets angry, it signals that they have reached their limits and will not 
accept a lower offer, alerting the other negotiators of potential conflict escalation if they do not 
compromise (Lieleveld et al. 2013, 607). Thus, when we express moral anger in our 
relationships, it can signal that we have reached our limits in terms of tolerating a particular 
23 
behavior, and provide agents with a salient reminder to change their behavior before it harms the 
relationship.   
Furthermore, research suggests that moral anger is often more focused on temporary 
situations, and more easily diminishes following attempts by the agent to make reparations 
(Hutcherson & Gross 2013, 733). Thus, moral anger seems to be closely tied to the function of 
repairing and even improving relationships through active communication and immediate 
resolutions. Ultimately, the specific context surrounding an action and the kind of relationship 
people are engaged in will determine whether moral anger or moral sadness will be more 
communicatively effective, and whether it will benefit or damage a relationship. In section 3.3, I 
build on the communicative role of moral anger and moral sadness to consider how it changes 
agents’ behaviors, at both the dyadic and the societal level.  
3.3 Changing Agents’ Behavior with Moral Anger and Moral Sadness 
Expressions of moral anger and moral sadness can change an agent’s harmful behavior 
by triggering complimentary or reciprocal emotional reactions in the agent. As the target of 
moral anger, people tend to feel fear, which is unpleasant. To avoid feeling fear, people often 
avoid the harmful behaviors that cause people to be morally angry. Pereboom argues that since 
moral anger only changes an agent’s behavior through fear of punishment, moral sadness is a 
better emotion to express when trying to change an agent’s behavior because moral sadness 
would encourage agents to change their behavior by appealing to an agent’s “moral values.” In 
other words, Pereboom argues that moral anger only changes an agent’s behavior by making the 
agent feel unpleasant, whereas moral sadness succeeds in changing an agent’s behavior by 
inspiring the agent to morally reflect on her behavior.   
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However, both moral anger and moral sadness can influence an agent’s future behavior 
by making them feel bad for their wrongdoings. As the target of moral sadness, people tend to 
feel guilt, which some research suggests is more unpleasant than feeling fear (Hutcherson & 
Gross 2013, 729). To avoid feeling guilty, people often avoid the harmful behaviors that can 
cause people to be morally sad. Additionally, both moral anger and moral sadness can inspire an 
agent to reflect on their actions, and can thereby change an agent’s behavior by appealing to their 
morality. Emotional expressions provide information to agents that can be used as feedback to 
make inferences about one’s past behaviors, and motivate one to correct one’s future behavior 
(Van Kleef 2009). For example, when an individual expresses moral anger with an agent for 
breaking a promise, the expression of anger can lead the agent to reflect on whether his behavior 
was morally wrong. When we infer that someone’s anger towards us is appropriate because our 
action was wrong, this inference can motivate us to apologize and avoid the harmful behavior in 
the future (Van Kleef 2009). Thus, expressions of moral anger and moral sadness can change an 
agent’s behavior by triggering emotional reactions, inferential processes, or both.  
Research also suggests that in the absence of guilt, the expression of moral sadness does 
not usually lead agents to improve their behavior, and can even make their behavior worse. The 
expression of moral sadness generally communicates weakness and a need for support. Thus, 
when an agent feels compassion for or affiliation with the individual she wronged, she is likely 
to feel guilty in response to moral sadness (Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul 1995), and feel 
motivated to change her behavior. However, when agents perceive the individual as weak and do 
not feel guilty, they are more likely to exploit the individual (Lelieveld et al. 2013, 615). In such 
cases, moral sadness is counterproductive, and rather than correcting the agent’s behavior, it can 
potentially encourage the agent to behave in more harmful ways. Furthermore, in Pereboom’s 
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view, guilt is never justified because, like moral anger, it treats agents as if they were ultimately 
responsible for their thoughts and actions. If moral sadness is only effective in changing an 
agent’s behavior when it makes agents feel guilty, and guilt is unjustified, then we should not be 
justified in feeling and expressing moral sadness towards agents to change their behaviors.   
To return to Pereboom’s specific examples from section 2.4 of how we can justifiably 
change an agent’s behavior, he claims that in the context of interpersonal relationships, we could 
respond to agents’ wrongdoings with moral sadness and provide a strongly worded threat to 
encourage them to change their behavior. However, threats, which typically accompany moral 
anger, change an agent’s behavior by causing them to feel fear. Since Pereboom explicitly argues 
against using aggression and intimidation to change an agent’s behavior, as well as feeling and 
expressing guilt for one’s wrongdoings, it is unclear how exactly we can justifiably use moral 
sadness to influence an agent’s behavior.  
Pereboom also claims that figures like Gandhi and MLK show that we can resist 
oppression without the use of moral anger. However, both Gandhi and MLK discussed the 
essential role that moral anger plays in social revolution. While Gandhi advocated for non-
violence and maintaining control over one’s moral anger, he also discussed how moral anger 
provides the fuel to fight against injustice. He said: 
Use your anger for good.  Anger to people is like gas to the automobile – it fuels 
you to move forward and get to a better place.  Without it we would not be 
motivated to rise to a challenge.  It is an energy that compels us to define what is 
just and unjust. (Gandhi 2017) 
In other words, moral anger is the source of resolve against injustice. Gandhi recommended that 
we should closely regulate our moral anger so that it does not manifest in violence or blind fury, 
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but instead manifests in the motivation to tackle the causes of injustice. This view importantly 
differs from Pereboom’s in so far as it does not argue that we would be better off if we did not 
feel moral anger altogether.3 
Meanwhile, MLK argued that we need a range of emotional behaviors to resist 
oppression. He advocated for passive aggressive behaviors, such as boycotting the bus system, as 
a form of retaliation against injustice, and also defended more active forms of aggression in 
response to injustice: 
But it is not enough for me to stand before you tonight and condemn riots. It 
would be morally irresponsible for me to do that without, at the same time, 
condemning the contingent, intolerable conditions that exist in our society. These 
conditions are the things that cause individuals to feel that they have no other 
alternative than to engage in violent rebellions to get attention. And I must 
say tonight that a riot is the language of the unheard. And what is it America has 
failed to hear? ...It has failed to hear that the promises of freedom and justice have 
not been met. And it has failed to hear that large segments of white society are 
more concerned about tranquility and the status quo than about justice and 
humanity. (King III & King 2005) 
MLK argued that while metaphorically quiet expressions of moral anger, such as peaceful 
protests, are useful in signaling dissatisfaction and the potential for escalation, loud and more 
                                                 
3  This characterization of anger as a motivating force coheres with Martha Nussbaum’s recent description of 
“transition-anger,” or anger that involves protesting wrongdoings without aiming to harm wrongdoers (Nussbaum 
2017). Nussbaum, like Pereboom, argues firmly against the practical benefits of feeling and expressing moral anger, 
claiming that it manifests in harmful retributive behaviors that “poison” democracy (2017, 4). However, in 
referencing figures like Gandhi and MLK, she concedes that moral anger is practically beneficial in motivating 
individuals to action against injustice (2017, 17). Thus, while her view generally posits an overly strong relationship 
between moral anger and retributive behavior, she claims that transition-anger is forward-looking in that “it gets to 
work finding solutions rather than dwelling on the infliction of retrospective pain,” and that such anger is useful and 
justified (2017, 4).  
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active expressions of moral anger are also necessary when we need to disrupt the status quo and 
demand change. In such cases, moral anger is essential to protect oneself, to improve 
relationships, and to change agent’s behavior. Ultimately, moral sadness serves important 
functions in response to agent’s wrongdoings, but it is misguided and potentially dangerous to 
suggest that we should always replace moral sadness with moral anger. Such a replacement, if it 
were humanly possible, would yield harmful consequences for the targets of injustice, and 
ultimately lead to a decline in our relationships and wellbeing.  
Given this functional account of moral anger and moral sadness, I conclude that 
Pereboom is wrong in claiming that the feeling and expression of moral sadness are always more 
practically beneficial than moral anger. In the appropriate contexts, moral anger protects 
individuals from harm, benefits relationships, and incentivizes agents to change their harmful 
behavior. In other words, moral anger promotes future safety and stability, and encourages future 
cooperation and good behavior. These functions are forward-looking by Pereboom’s definition, 
since they focus on improving future conditions rather than merely getting even with agents for 
past actions (2013, 135). In section 4, I argue that since the functions of moral anger, like moral 
sadness, are forward-looking, moral anger does not require ultimate moral responsibility, and is 
justified in the appropriate contexts.  
  
28 
4 IS MORAL ANGER JUSTIFIED? 
Pereboom argues that moral anger is by definition backward-looking since it holds agents 
accountable for their wrongdoings with the aim of getting even with them for the harm that they 
caused. In other words, Pereboom characterizes the function of moral anger in terms of 
retribution, and retribution is only justified if we are ultimately morally responsible for our 
wrongdoings. Meanwhile, he argues that moral sadness is forward-looking because it expresses 
disapproval of the agent’s wrongdoings with the aim of reconciling with the agent or helping 
them change their future actions. In this view, the function of moral sadness is to facilitate 
positive future outcomes following an agent’s wrongdoing. Thus, moral sadness is rational 
because it does not treat agents as if they are ultimately morally responsible, and it is fair because 
it does not retributively punish agents by making them feel bad for their wrongdoings. 
A functional account of moral anger and moral sadness, however, undermines 
Pereboom’s claim that only moral sadness is forward-looking. The function of moral anger is not 
retribution itself, but rather the reparation of injustice. Whereas moral sadness makes a plea for 
reparations by instilling guilt, moral anger demands reparations by communicating a readiness to 
defend. Thus, both moral anger and moral sadness cause agents to feel bad for their wrongdoings 
in order to facilitate positive future outcomes. Given their forward-looking aims, neither moral 
anger nor moral sadness, according to Pereboom’s own criteria, would require ultimate moral 
responsibility. He says:  
Accordingly, it is an agent’s responsiveness to reasons (cf. Fischer and Ravizza 
1998), together with the fact that we have a moral interest in our protection, his 
moral formation, and our reconciliation with him that explains why he is an 
appropriate recipient of blame in this forward-looking sense…. The forward-
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looking sort of moral responsibility I advocate is also compatible with agents 
being causally determined in their actions by factors beyond their control. (2013, 
135-136) 
Based on the empirical evidence I have provided, I argue that since moral anger, like moral 
sadness, has forward-looking aims, it does not require agents to be the ultimate sources of their 
wrongdoings. Thus, I reject Pereboom’s definition of moral anger as an emotion that we feel and 
express with the primary purpose of retributively punishing wrongdoers. While a lack of ultimate 
moral responsibility may threaten the justifiability of retributive behaviors and social practices 
that focus narrowly on making wrongdoers suffer, it does not affect the justifiability of feeling 
and expressing moral anger in the appropriate contexts.    
If my functional account is correct, and moral anger does not require ultimate moral 
responsibility, then Pereboom is wrong that moral anger is never justified because it is irrational, 
unfair, and not practically beneficial. On the contrary, moral anger is rational to feel and fair to 
express. Furthermore, it is practically beneficial to feel and express when we need to actively 
confront an unjust agent, particularly when we do not have positive expectations from them and 
they do not sympathize with us. In such cases, down-regulating moral anger and fostering moral 
sadness in its place would likely fail to benefit us, and could potentially even harm us by 
signaling weakness to our oppressors or preparing us to withdraw from necessary confrontation. 
Hence, when moral anger is appropriate given the circumstances surrounding the agent’s actions 
and the relationship between the individual and the agent, moral anger is justified.   
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5 CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I offered a functional account of moral anger and moral sadness to argue 
that while both emotions can produce adaptive responses to agents’ wrongdoings, moral anger is 
a more appropriate response to agents’ wrongdoings in cases where we must actively confront an 
agent. In such cases, moral anger is more practically beneficial than moral sadness in facilitating 
positive future outcomes: it protects the self and others from present and future harm; it promotes 
open communication and reparations that can benefit relationships; and it incentivizes agents to 
improve their future behavior. Thus, contrary to Pereboom’s claims, universally replacing moral 
anger with moral sadness would be pragmatically harmful. 
Furthermore, I argued that a functional account of moral anger undermines Pereboom’s 
view that moral anger is irrational and unfair because it requires ultimate moral responsibility. If 
we are not the ultimate sources of our thoughts and actions, then Pereboom may be correct that 
many of our common retributive behaviors and social practices that focus solely on making 
wrongdoers suffer are not justified. However, on my account the function of moral anger is not, 
as Pereboom claims, retribution itself, but rather the reparation of injustice. Since moral anger 
has forward-looking aims like moral sadness, it does not require ultimate moral responsibility, 
and is both rational and fair in response to agents’ wrongdoings. Thus, when it is an appropriate 
response to an agent’s wrongdoing, moral anger is justified.  
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